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Memorandum Evaluation of the Merit of Phoenix's Argument for Disqualification of
Amber & Lewis:

The following arguments must be considered in determiing the position Amberg and Lewis.

I. The Court should not disqualify Amberg & Lewis from representing Biogenesis Because
Amberg and Lewis Violated No Ethical Rules in its Handling of the Unathorized Document
it was Sent Anonymously and Because Biogenesis will Suffer Incurable Prejudice if its
Attorneys are Disqualified at this Lat Date in Proceedings.

1. Amberg and Lewis Violated No Ethical Rules in its Handling of the Unathorized Document
through an Unathorized Disclosure, for which a Court should determine the Appropriate Use or
Disposal.

Rule 4.4 of the Franklin Rules of Professional Conduct, set in place by the Supreme Court of
Franklin, require that an attorney who inadvertently receives a document promptly notify the
sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures, but need do no more. This rule
supersedes Indigo v. Luna, which had concluded that a requirement that an attorney inadvertently
receiving such a document had to "resist the temptation to examine the document." While there
is no clear precedent established as to the procedure that should be followed when an attorney
recieves a document sent without authorization, a decision at the appellate court level, Mead v.
Conley, concluded that an attorney should examine such a document only to the degree necessary
to determine how to proceed, and abide by or refrain from using the document until a court
disposed of the matter. The Franklin Supreme Court has declined to adopt an ethical rule
establishing an ethical obligation in such a matter.

2. In this case, Amberg received the document anonymously. through no action of its own.
The document was not inadvertently disclosed, as in Luna, but an unauthorized disclosure as in
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Mead. Because of the brevity of the document and the manner in which it was received, here was
no opportunity for Amberg to do more than to note the existence of the document and its
contents. Phoenix became aware that Amberg has the document the very same day, when its
president overheard two staffers discussing the situation at lunch. Any failure to notify the
opposing party that it had received the document was merely a matter of hours, and the facts
disclosed in the very short document were such as to raise serious questions of previouS
disclosure sufficiency by the other party and other matters. A document of only three sentences in
length may be perused in a mater of seconds, and there is no question but that the need to look at
the docuent in order to identify its nature required reading it in its entirely. Moreover, the
appropriate determination as to what should be done with the document is not up the Phoenix,
but rather a matter to be submitted to the Court, as observed in Mead v. Conley.

II. Amberg &Lewis Should Not be Disqualified From Representation of Biogenesis Even if
the Court Determines that Amberg Should Return Or Not Make Use of the Do~ument
B~ause Biogensis

Would Suffer In~urable Preiudi~e.

The general rule is that a trial court may disqulify an attorney in the interests ofjustice (In re
Klein, 1947). In Mead, the Ct. of Appeals of Franklin held that the trial court had not abused its
discretion by disqualifying an attorney simply because the attorney had not violated a rule of
professional conduct, holding that a trial court may disqualify an attorney with or without a
specific rule. Conflict between a client's right to an attorney of his choice and the need ,to
maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility, the client's rights may have to yeild to
the imporatnce of the scrupulous administration ofjustice and integrity of the bar. (Indigo v.
Luna, 1998). In this case, however, the clients neeseriously outweight, any interest of Phoenix in
the matter, and will serve rather than harm the interests ofjustice.

A court may make a decision to disqualify an attorney who has received an unauthorized
document on the following bases established in Mead: after a consideration of all the relevant
facts and circumstances of a case, including (1) the attoney's actual or constructive knowledge of
the materials privileged status, (2) the promptness with which the attorney notified the opposing
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side that he had received the material, and (3) the extent to which the attorney reviewed the
material, (4) the significance of the material and the exte~t to which it might prejudice the party,
(5) the extent to which the party moving for disqualification may be at fault for the unathorized
disclisure, and (6) the extent to which the part opposing disqualification would suffer prejudice
from the disqualification of his atorney: Of these. the court in Mead held that "incurable
prejudice was the most decisive.

This case offers certain similarities to Luna, but there are also distinguishing elements. In Luna,
the attorney who rceived the unathorized document did not notify the opposing attorney not only
failed to notify the opposing attorney, she also used the document in trial in a manner damaging
to the other party without that notice. In this case,Phoenix had constructive notice of AMbergs
receipt within a few hours. On objection, the attorney in Luna failed even to return the document
to the attorney from whom it had come. Amberg and Lewis are requesting that the court dispose
of this matter in the way it sees fit, as established in Mead, and waits on the court's decision
rather than taking one on its own.

(1) Acutal or constructive knowledge of thematerial's privileged status. Amberg acknowledges

that the privileged nature of the leter is obvious on its face, but since the letter is so short and its
arrival so obscure, there was no way of identifying it without reading it.
(2) Promptness of return. There was little or no opportunity for Amberg to return the document
prior to Phoenix's discovery that Amberg had possession, since Amberg only had poss~ssion for
a matter of hours before Phoenix was aware of it.
(3) Review of the material. The extent to which the attorney reviewed the the admisions in the
letter was necessarily in its complete form, since it was only a few sentences long.
(4) Significance of the material. Although brief, the material in the letter is certainly significant
in Phoenix' eyes, perhaps of damning significance, and constitutes an admission by Phoenix of
substantial harm to its case. However, the letter is unquestionably authentic, and there is ample
opportunity at trial to determine if it relevent to the case.Phoenix cannot ask that it be excluded
on the basis of the interests ofjustice, and will have a full and fair opportunity to address the
meaning of the letter in court.
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(5) Fault for disclosure. In this case there is not fault to be attributed to Amberg for disclosure of
the letter. On the contrary, it appears to have been sent to Amberg in the interests that there be
full and fair disclosure of Phoenix's motives in claiming additional roylties, simple greed rather
than a legitimate dsire for their due.
(6) Biogenesis would suffer incurable prejudice if their attorneys were disqualified. This is the
real crux of the matter. Biogenesis would suffer severe prejudice and would have to incur
tremendous costs if it were forced to substitute new attorneys. It would also suffer substantially
in terms of trial readiness because the case is enourmously complicated and that delay in itself
would place a burden on the justice system, especially since trial in this case is imminent. The
case involves manu hundreds of attorney-hours and substantial research into highly technical
documents. Phoenix's demands for additional royalties have already placed enormous legal
demands on a company whose focus and efforts are better directed to the development of
important new technologies for the betterment of society.

Conclusion:
The argument both for retention of the letter until such time as a court may decide its disposal,
and the argument that Amberg and Lewis should continue to serve as attorneys for Biodgenesis
are strongly supported by the holding in Mead and the determination of the Franklin Supreme
Court to leave Rule 4.4 in its current form. Amberg was at no fault in receipt of the document,
and Biogenesis would suffer incyrable prejudice were it to have to change attorneys at this
time.The appropriate remedy is to submit the dispute to the court, as noted in Mead.This case
offers certain similarities to Luna, but there are also distinguishing elements. In Luna, the
attorney who rceived the unathorized document did not notify the opposing attorney not only
failed to notify the opposing attorney, she also used the document in trial in a manner damaging
to the other party without that notice. In this case,Phoenix had constructive notice of AMbergs
receipt within a few hours. On objection, the attorney in Luna failed even to return the document
to the attorney from whom it had come. Amberg and Lewis are requesting that the court dispose
of this matter in the way it sees fit, as established in Mead, and waits on the court's decision
rather than taing one on its own.
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We beleive that by submitting the issue fairly to the court, that Amberg will be vindicated, at
least for the most part, both by the existing law and by letting the court deal with the difficulties
in determining whether to return the letter or not in view of the obvious practical problems in
doing so at this point, since the knowledge cannot be erased, and since the letter presents Phoenix
in such a culpable light. The scrupulous administration ofjustice requires the fullest possible
disclosure of the facts as well as the most professional actions of the Bar, and according to the
Franklin Rules, the appropriate decision maker with respect to return of the docment, as
established by law, is the court, not Amberg and Lewis who have done all they should ~n this
instance by presenting the court with the circumstances relevant to its decision.

END OF EXAM
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